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ABSTRACT
Macroeconomists acknowledge the contribution of human capital to economic growth, but their
empirical studies define human capital solely in terms of schooling. In this paper, we extend production
function models of economic growth to account for two additional variables that microeconomists have
identified as fundamental components of human capital: work experience and health. Our main result is
that good health has a positive, sizable, and statistically significant effect on aggregate output. We find
little variation across countries in average work experience, thus differentials in work experience account
for little variation in rates of economic growth. Finally, we find that the effects of average schooling on
national output are consistent with microeconomic estimates of the effects of individual schooling on
earnings, suggesting that education creates no discernible externalities.
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Although labor quality in the form of human capital clearly contributes 
significantly to economic growth, most cross-country empirical studies identify labor 
quality narrowly with education. Our central argument is that this practice ignores strong 
reasons for considering health to be a crucial aspect of human capital, and therefore a 
critical ingredient of economic growth. Healthier workers are physically and mentally 
more energetic and robust. They are more productive and earn higher wages. They are 
also less likely to be absent from work because of illness (or illness in their family). 
Illness and disability reduce hourly wages substantially, with the effect especially strong 
in developing countries, where a higher proportion of the work force is engaged in 
manual labor than in industrial countries. A substantial body of microeconomic evidence 
documents many of these effects (see Strauss and Thomas 1998). Testing whether such 
effects translate into an aggregate effect of population health on economic growth is 
important. Health, in the form of life expectancy, has appeared in many cross-country 
growth regressions, and investigators generally find that it has a significant positive effect 
on the rate of economic growth (see Bloom and Canning 2000, 2001).  However, these 
regressions do not clearly indicate whether health directly benefits growth or whether it is 
merely a proxy for other missing or mismeasured factors (see, for example, Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin 1995).  
The main objective of this study is to include health in a well-specified aggregate 
production function in an attempt to test for the existence of a true effect of health on 
labor productivity, and to measure its strength. However, because human capital is  4
multidimensional, we need a model of growth that includes all its major components. 
This ensures that we do not erroneously overestimate the contribution of one component 
by mistakenly attributing to it the contributions of those components we omit. Thus we 
further add work experience to our model, because considerable microeconomic evidence 
indicates that it has an impact on workers￿ earnings (see, for example, Mincer 1974). We 
construct macroeconomic measures of health and work experience to examine whether 
microeconomic evidence of their importance as forms of human capital carries over into 
their ability to explain economic growth.  
To this end we construct an aggregate production function that expresses a 
nation’s output as a function of its inputs and the efficiency with which it uses these 
inputs. These inputs are physical capital, labor, and human capital in the three dimensions 
of education, experience, and health. Our model also considers the efficiency with which 
these inputs are used, that is, total factor productivity (TFP). We estimate all the 
parameters of this production function using panel data for 1960-90 and obtain measures 
of the relative contributions of each of the inputs and of TFP to economic growth. 
  An alternative approach is to calibrate the model using microeconomic evidence 
for parameter values (see, for instance, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997; Prescott 1998; 
Young 1994, 1995). The potential advantage of estimation over calibration is that the 
microeconomic evidence measures the effect of improvements in an individual’s human 
capital on own earnings, ignoring the additional effects it might have on other individuals 
or on society as a whole. These additional effects, that is, externalities, might arise 
because people￿s productivity depends on the productivity of their coworkers. When 
workers obtain more schooling, their earnings rise, but those of their coworkers may rise  5
as well. By estimating the returns to human capital in aggregate, we let these returns 
differ from microeconomic estimates, which allows us to make inferences about the 
existence and magnitude of the externalities. 
Our main result is that health has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
economic growth. It suggests that a one year improvement in a population’s life 
expectancy contributes to a 4 percent increase in output.  
We also find that our estimates of the contributions of education and work 
experience are close to those found in microeconomic studies. Indeed, the differences 
between our parameter estimates and the averages found in microeconomic studies are 
usually statistically insignificant. Thus we find no evidence of the existence of 
externalities to human capital in the form of schooling and experience (or such 
externalities are too small for us to detect). While large cross-country differences in life 
expectancy and average years of schooling explain a substantial proportion of the income 
gaps we observe between countries, cross-country differences in average work experience 





We assume that we can decompose economic growth into two sources: growth in the 
level of inputs and growth in TFP. We take our inputs to be physical capital, labor, and 
human capital.   6
We model output as a function of inputs and technology using the following 
aggregate production function: 
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where Y  is output or gross domestic product (GDP);  A represents TFP; K  is physical 
capital; L is the labor force; and human capital consists of three components, average 
years of schooling s, average work experience of the work force exp, average square of 
work experience 
2 exp , and health h (which we proxy with life expectancy). We express 
the effect of the human capital terms on output as powers of an exponential. As long as 
workers earn their marginal product, using this functional form implies that log wages 
depend on the level of schooling, experience, experience squared, and health status, 
which is the relationship usually found in microeconomic studies. 
  Taking logs of the aggregate production function, we derive an equation for the 
log of output in country i at time t : 
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where  , , it it k y  and  it l  it are the logs of  , , it it K Y  and  it L , respectively. Equation (2) is an 
identity, but in practice  it a , the level of TFP in country i at time t , is not observed and 
appears as an error term when the equation is estimated.   7
We model TFP as follows: 
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where  1 0 < < ρ  and  it ε  is a random shock. Each country has a long￿run, steady-state 
level of TFP given by  *
it a . Its actual TFP, given by  it a , deviates from the steady state by 
the random difference  it v , which consists of systematic and idiosyncratic components. 
The systematic difference, represented by  1 − it v ρ , shrinks over time.  The idiosyncratic 
randomness is represented by  it ε . A simple special case popular in the literature (see, for 
example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992) is to posit that  *
it a  is the same for every 
country, so that 
* *
t it a a = . In this case,  it v  represents country i’s deviation from the 
world’s common level of technology at time t . This deviation may be persistent, but as 
time passes, this country’s TFP converges to the world level at the rate  ρ − 1,  w h i c h  
represents the speed of technological diffusion. 
  While technology may eventually diffuse, some countries may enjoy long-run 
advantages in TFP that are not eroded over time, so that 
* *
t it a a ≠ . To parsimoniously 
model how steady-state TFP may differ across countries, we allow 
*
it a  to be a function of 
geography, proxied by the percentage of country i’s area that is in the tropics, and a 
measure of the quality of its political institutions.  Tropical location has recently been 
viewed as a geographical disadvantage to growth because of obstacles it creates in the 
diffusion of agricultural technologies from temperate to tropical zones, disadvantages in  8
food production, and infectious disease ecology (see Bloom and Sachs 1998).  The quality 
of political institutions, on the other hand, has been argued to affect economic growth 
because it provides the social stability, effective provision of public services, and 
enforcement of private contracts that are required for growth. 
For estimation purposes, turning our production function into a growth equation is 
useful. Differencing equation (2) gives us 
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Substituting out the error term  it v ∆  using equation (3) and noting that the lagged 
productivity gap  1 − it v  is the difference between actual output and output at the average 
world TFP level at time  1 − t generates 
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Equation (5) shows that growth in output can be decomposed into four components: the 
growth of world TFP; the growth of inputs; a catch-up term as some of the country￿s TFP 
gap,  1 − it v , is closed and the country converges to its steady-state level of TFP at the rate 
ρ − 1 ,; and an idiosyncratic shock to the country￿s TFP,  it ε .   9
The problem with estimating equation (5) as it stands is reverse causality. While 
we are interested in measuring the contribution of input growth to output growth, output 
growth may have a reverse causal effect on input growth. For example, economic growth 
may stimulate investments in physical capital. Output growth may also augment human 
capital by facilitating increased schooling or improving people￿s health (see, for example, 
Bils and Klenow 2000; Pritchett and Summers 1996). Statistically speaking, this reverse 
causality creates a correlation between the input growth (independent) variables and the 
error term  it ε  that renders ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficients in equation 
(5) inconsistent.  
Consider a country that experiences an unforeseen and idiosyncratic improvement 
in efficiency,  0 > it ε , that raises output, and therefore also raises inputs through the 
mechanisms just explained. We would observe growth in both outputs and inputs, yet 
incorrectly attribute the growth in outputs to growth in inputs, when in reality the 
relationship is exactly the reverse. This would lead us to overstate the contribution of 
inputs to growth. We need to disentangle the effect of inputs on growth from the effect 
that growth has on inputs. We accomplish this by using an instrumental variables (IVs) 
technique. An IV is a variable that must satisfy two criteria. First, it must be correlated 
with the endogenous independent variables, that is, the variables that suffer from reverse 
causation. In our case, these endogenous variables are the input growth rates in equation 
(5). Second, it must be uncorrelated with the error term  it ε , conditional on the IV￿s 
correlation with every other specified independent variable on the right-hand-side of 
equation (5). Intuitively, this second requirement implies that the IV must be uncorrelated 
with any random TFP shocks that might provoke the reverse causal mechanism described  10
earlier. If such an IV exists, then the first condition ensures that variations in the IV 
induce variations in the endogenous inputs. The second condition ensures that the reverse 
causality problem will not contaminate these induced variations in the endogenous inputs. 
Thus correlations between variations in output and the induced variations in the 
endogenous inputs can be interpreted as the causal effect of input growth on output 
growth, disentangled from the reverse causality problem.  
We assume that lagged levels and growth rates of inputs serve as valid IVs. These 
clearly satisfy the first condition: lagged input use is a good predictor of current input use. 
It also arguably satisfies the second condition. While lagged input use probably correlates 
with predictable changes in the efficiency with which a nation uses its inputs, it is 
unlikely to be related to unpredictable changes in this efficiency, represented by the 
idiosyncratic error term  it ε . Assuming lagged inputs satisfy the two conditions is quite 
compatible with lagged TFP levels and expected TFP growth (the catch-up term in 
equation [5]) affecting previous input decisions. An important implication of our model is 
that the coefficients on a lagged input level and its current growth rate should be the 
same. We test this restiction as a simple check on our model￿s assumptions. Failure to 





We construct a panel of countries observed every 10 years from 1960 to 1990. Output 
data (GDP) are obtained from the Penn World Tables (see Heston and Summers 1994 for  11
a description). We obtain total output by multiplying real per capita GDP measured in 
1985 international purchasing power parity dollars (chain index) by national population.  
We measure a country’s labor supply by the size of its economically active 
population using data from the International Labour Office (1997), which also gives labor 
force participation rates disaggregated by gender and five-year age groups. However, our 
labor supply measure is unable to adjust for the fact that some fraction of the labor force 
is unemployed, and therefore should not be counted as providing labor inputs. Nor are we 
able to adjust for the hours the labor force works. Schooling is mea sured by the average 
total years of schooling of the population aged 15 years and older from Barro and Lee 
(2000).  
Life expectancy data are from the United Nations (1998). We use these as a proxy 
for the health of the work force, even though they measure mortality rates rather than 
morbidity. Higher life expectancy is generally thought to be associated with better health 
status and lower morbidity (Murray and Chen 1992; Murray and Lopez 1997). 
We construct a measure of aggregate work experience for each country by 
computing an experience measure for each of 22 gender and age group combinations 
(male and female for age groups 15-19, 20-24,...,60-64, 65+). Experience is simply the 
amount of time spent in the labor force. For each group we measure this by average age 
minus average years of schooling minus the age at which schooling starts, which we 
uniformly assume to be six. This measure of experience is likely to be reasonable for 
males, but may overstate the experience of females, who more frequently spend periods 
out of the labor market. For simplicity in our calculations, we take the average age of  
each group to be the mid-point of its age range. Average work force experience for the  12
country as a whole is a weighted average of the group-specific experience measures, 
where the weights are the shares of each group in the total economically active 
population. Aggregate squared experience is the analogous weighted average of the 
squared experience of each group.  
In this calculation of experience, measured years of schooling for groups aged 25 
and older differ by gender, but are assumed to be constant across age groups within each 
gender. They are set to Barro and Lee￿s (2000) measures of total schooling for the male 
and female populations older than 25. We calculated the years of schooling for the groups 
aged 15-19 and 20-24 by combining Barro and Lee￿s data on schooling for populations 
aged 15 or more and 25 or more to infer education for the population aged 15-24, using 
the fact that schooling for the population older than 15 equals the weighted average of 
schooling for the 15-24 population and schooling for the population older than 25 where 
the weights are population shares.  
  As data on capital stocks for the time period we are interested in are meager for 
most countries, we generate a capital stock series for each country using a perpetual 
inventory method. We initialize the capital stock series in the first year for the Penn 
World Tables (version 5.6) provide investment data, setting the capital stock equal to the 
average investment/GDP ratio in the first five years of data, multiplied by the level of 
GDP in the initializing period, and divided by 0.07, our assumed depreciation rate. This is 
the capital stock we would expect in the initial year if the investment/GDP ratio we use is 
representative of previous rates. Each succeeding period’s capital is given by current 
capital minus depreciation at 7 percent, plus the level of current investment.   13
Our capital stock series has wider coverage than the Heston and Summers  (1994) 
variable for capital stock per worker, which is only available for 62 countries from 1965 
onward. Where the two overlap, the correlation coefficient between the log levels of our 
series and theirs is 0.97, indicating that the two series are similar. For many countries 
investment series do not start until 1960, suggesting that our capital stock data for the 
1960s may be suspect, because of the way we construct the initial stock of capital. 
Because of depreciation, by 1970 the capital stock estimates become fairly independent of 
the initializing assumption used. We therefore limit our estimation to 1970-90, though we 
use data from 1960-70 as instruments. 
Our measure of institutional quality is the good governance variable from Knack 
and Keifer (1995), while the percentage of land area in the tropics comes from Gallup, 
Sachs, and Mellinger (1999). 
4. Estimation and Results 
 
We begin by estimating equation (5) under the assumption that steady-state TFP levels 
are the same in every country, or in other words  t it a a
* * = . The results are reported in 
table 1. Each regression is estimated by nonlinear least squares, and all contemporaneous 
growth rates of inputs are instrumented with their lagged growth rates. Time dummies 
(not reported) are included to proxy the average global level of TFP in each period; these 
appear in levels in the catch-up part of the regression, while the differences between 
successive time periods measure growth in average TFP over the period.  
  14
[insert table 1 about here] 
 
The results in column (1) of table 1 include only physical capital, labor, and 
schooling as inputs. We find coefficients of close to 0.5 for both capital and labor. We 
can show that under certain standard assumptions about technology and competition 
(specifically, that technology displays constant returns to scale and that input markets are 
perfectly competitive), these coefficients should be equal to the share of each of these 
inputs in national income. This makes us suspect the results of this estimation, because 
the respective shares of capital and labor in national income are typically one-third and 
two-thirds, respectively (see Mankiw 1994, p. 74).  However, the sum of these 
coefficients is close to one, which is what we would expect under constant returns to 
scale technology. Our estimate of the coefficient on schooling translates into a social rate 
of return of 17.2 percent
2, which is somewhat higher than the average of 9.1 percent 
found in microeconomic studies. However, while we find that this estimated rate of return 
to schooling is significantly different from zero, it is not well determined, and we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that it is the same as the microeconomic estimate of 9.1 percent. The 
catch-up coefficient is 0.196, indicating that almost 20 percent of the gap between a 
                                                           













where  it S , which represents the total years of schooling in the population, is related to the average years of 





s = .  The marginal cost of this decision is that  15
country’s actual and steady-state TFP is closed over a decade, implying an annual rate of 
convergence of about 2 percent.  
Adding experience variables in column (2) has the effect that none of the human 
capital coefficients is now significant. However, when we calculate the rate of return to 
schooling we get 12.8 percent, which is statistically different from zero, though once 
again we cannot reject the hypothesis that the actual rate of return is 9.1 percent. The 
coefficients on average experience and average experience squared are large in absolute 
size, though poorly determined. We cannot reject the possibility that these coefficients are 
jointly zero, or indeed, that they produce estimates of the productivity of experience that 
are the same as those found in the microeconomic studies.  
The reason for the poorly determined coefficients on our experience measures 
seems to be that in our sample average experience and average of experience squared are 
highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is above 0.98). Average experience in our 
sample ranges from 18 to 28 years, and over this short range its relationship with the 
average of experience squared is almost completely linear.
3 The wide range of years of 
work experience we see in microeconomic data allows us to identify the nonlinear 
relationship between experience and wages, but in macroeconomic data the small 
                                                                                                                                                                             




















3 The average of experience squared can be written as the square of average experience plus the variance of 
experience across individuals within the country. This implies that it is not only the lack of variation in 
average experience that is the problem, but also that the variance of experience across the work force is 
similar across countries.  16
variation in average experience across countries means we cannot pick up such subtle 
effects.  
 Adding life expectancy in column (3) gives similar results. Again, the human 
capital measures are jointly statistically significant, but we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the coefficients are equal to those found in microeconomic studies. The coefficient 
on life expectancy is 0.01, suggesting that increasing life expectancy by one year 
improves work force productivity and raises output by about 1 percent, though this effect 
is not well determined and the coefficient is not statistically significant. Note that in 
column 3 the coefficients on capital and labor take on values that are close to their 
stylized factor shares of one-third and two-thirds.  
In all three regressions in table 1 we cannot reject the hypothesis that we have 
constant returns to scale, that is, that the coefficients on physical capital and labor add to 
one. In addition, in each regression we cannot reject the restriction that the coefficients on 
the levels and growth rates of inputs are equal. 
We do not report estimates of world technology levels, and these are not fully 
identified. We can estimate the total technology effect for each period (the sum of the 
world rise in the level of technology, plus the convergence effect as countries catch up 
with the base year’s world technology level). However, we cannot separate these two 
effects without imposing additional restrictions. The problem is that if we see rapid 
growth in a particular period, we cannot say if it is because the base year TFP level was  17
high and all countries are converging toward this, or because world TFP has grown 
quickly during the period.
4  
Overall, the picture that emerges from table 1 is that the macroeconomic results 
are surprisingly close to the results found in microeconomic studies. In every case we find 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the macroeconomic estimates on the returns to 
schooling and experience are the same as the microeconomic evidence. In all 
specifications we appear to have constant returns to scale, though in some the coefficient 
on physical capital appears to be closer to half rather than the one-third that seems to be 
the stylized fact. TFP exhibits large gaps across countries, but these gaps are being closed 
at the rate of about 2 percent a year.  
  The results in table 1 may depend on our assumption that the steady-state level of 
TFP is the same in every country. We experimented with different geographical and 
institutional variables that may explain long-run differences in TFP and settled on the 
percentage of land area in the tropics and a measure of governance as the two that seem 
most significant in our framework. We include these variables (which are taken as fixed 
over time) in the levels part of equation (5).  
  Table 2 excludes average experience squared from the estimation. The average 
experience level in our sample is 23 years, and at this experience level the marginal 
impact of an extra year of experience on wages (using our microeconomic data 
coefficients) is about 1.8 percent, and the expected effect on output (assuming no 
                                                           
4 One additional restriction would identify TFP in the model. For example, we might fix world benchmark 
TFP in 1960 as the TFP of the United States (that is, set 1960 world TFP so that the error term for the 
United States in that year is zero), or as world average TFP (so that the average of the error terms in 1960 is 
zero). However, the normalization we use does affect the estimates of both the level and growth rate of 
world technology.  18
externalities) is therefore just (1.8  β × )  percent implying a coefficient on experience in 
our regressions of around 0.01.  
 
[insert table 2 about here] 
 
  In all three columns of table 2 the coefficient on schooling is small and not 
statistically significant. However, we cannot reject the possibility that the rate of return to 
schooling is 0.091 as given by microeconomic data. Adding average experience in 
columns (2) and (3) generates coefficients on experience that are negative and lower than 
the productivity effects found in microeconomic studies. This suggests that experience 
reduces aggregate output, even though in microeconomic data it increases individual 
wages.  
Adding life expectancy in column 3 produces a result that is positive and 
statistically significant, and suggests that each extra year of life expectancy raises the 
productivity of workers and leads to an increase of 4 percent in output. This is only 
slightly stronger than the effect found in most studies of the contribution of health to 
economic growth.
5 
                                                           
5 Studies of the contribution of health to growth often fit regressions of the form 
it it it it it it x h y y y ε α α α + + + = − − − 2 1 1 0 1 ln , where  it y  is log of per capita output,  it h  is life 
expectancy, and  it x  represents other regressors.  When output reaches the steady state,  0 1 = − − it it y y  and 












.  This quantity should be directly comparable to our 
coefficient on life expectancy of 0.04.  We can compute this quantity using representative results from 
Bloom, Canning, Graham, and Sevilla (2000) which have  63 , 81 . 2 , 69 . 1 1 0 = = − = it h α α  giving us  19
  As we would expect, countries with better governance tend to have higher steady-
state levels of TFP, while those in the tropics have lower TFP.  An F-test of the joint 
significance of the governance and tropics variables in each of the specifications in Table 
2 shows these to be significant at the 5% level, allowing us to reject the assumption 
underlying Table 1, that steady state TFP is constant across countries. The speed of TFP 
convergence is again around 2 to 2.5 percent a year. 
  While our results generally agree with those found in microeconomic ￿studies, our 
parameter estimates are not well determined. For example, in column 3 of table 2 even 
the coefficient on physical capital is not statistically significant. A central problem in 
macroeconomic studies is a lack of degrees of freedom. In addition, aggregate data 
exhibit a great deal of multicollinearity; capital intensity, education level, and health 
status all tend to move together. Average experience and average experience squared are 
highly correlated, while average experience is highly negatively correlated with average 
schooling (extra years of education mean less average work experience).  
  Determining the rates of return to inputs from macroeconomic data with any 
precision is likely to be difficult. This suggests that so long as the aggregate data do not 
suggest the presence of large externalities, calibrating macroeconomic models using 




                                                                                                                                                                             







.  Thus our present results imply somewhat larger returns to health than previous cross- 20
Our model accounts for economic growth by the growth of factor inputs, technological 
innovation, and technological diffusion. Our main result, consistent with our theoretical 
argument and with the microeconomic evidence, is that health has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on economic growth. It suggests that a one-year 
improvement in a population’s life expectancy contributes to an increase of 4 percent in 
output. This is a relatively large effect, indicating that increased expenditures on 
improving health might be justified purely on the grounds of their impact on labor 
productivity. 
We find no evidence that the macroeconomic effects of education and experience 
are any greater than those found in microeconomic studies. This suggests the absence of 
externalities at the aggregate level and that calibration studies provide reasonable pictures 
of the proximate sources of economic growth. Accounting for economic growth is only 
the first stage of an explanation. Once we have established the importance of physical and 
human capital we need to go behind these variables to ask what determines cross-country 
differences in factor accumulation. For example, our estimates of the effect of life 
expectancy capture only its direct effect on labor productivity. In a fully specified model, 
life expectancy may influence life cycle savings (Lee, Mason and Miller 2000) and capital 
accumulation, and the expected returns to and investment in education (Bils and Klenow 
(2000)). Thus improvements in health may increase output not only through labor 
productivity, but also through the accumulation of capital. A fully specified model of 
economic growth would be multidimensional, showing not only how inputs and 
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Table 1. Production Function in Growth Form, Common Long-Run TFP Across Countries 






















































N 175  175  175 
R
2 adjusted  0.628  0.581  0.549 
Test of equality of growth and 
level coefficients (chi-square 















Test that rate of return to 
schooling equals 0.091 (chi-







Test of zero coefficients on 






Test of constant returns to scale 







d.o.f.: degrees of freedom 
Estimated asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses below parameter estimates.    
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Note: Estimated on a panel of 104 countries for the growth periods 1970-80 and 1980-90.  
Year dummies are included throughout. 
Source: Authors￿ calculations. 
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Table 2. Production Function in Growth Form, Country-Specific Long-Run TFP 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP; Nonlinear two stage least squares estimates 
 
  



































   0.040* 
(0.019) 























N 147  147  147 
R
2 adjusted  0.711  0.679  0.539 
Test of equality of growth and level 

















Test that rate of return to schooling 








Test of constant returns to scale 







Test of joint significance of 
governance and tropics 










d.o.f.: degrees of freedom  
Estimated asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses below parameter estimates.    
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Note:Year dummies are included throughout. 
Source: Authors￿ calculations. 
 